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seem that the alleged contemnor could 
hardly meet his burden of proof. In viola-
tion of support orders, it is generally rec-
ognized that in the proceedings insti-
tuted to coerce payment of the ordered 
sums the burden is upon the alleged con-
temnor to prove his inability to comply 
with the order. 53 A. L. R. 2d 591. Since 
inability to pay is a complete defense, it is 
very important for the alleged contem-
nor to plan his defense adequately. The 
best way to plan a defense, however, is 
with the able assistance of an attomey, 
who would best know how to present 
the case to the judge and how to arrange 
an equitable solution with the State's At-
tomey. 
If the contemnor is indigent, then it 
does not seem possible for him to 
employ effective counsel. And, the fact 
that he may be indigent does not insure 
that he can convince the judge of his in-
ability to pay. Coercive imprisonment is 
remedial, of course, only when the de-
fendant is able to comply. Maggio v. 
Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76 (1948). And, as 
the Supreme Court said, " ... to jail one 
for a contempt for omitting an act he is 
powerless to perform ... would ... make 
the proceeding purely punitive, to de-
scribe it charitably." 333 U.S., at 72. 
This is true because imprisoning a de-
fendant incapable of performance can-
not possibly cause him to take action to 
benefit the complainant. 
The Maryland Rules of Procedure, 
Rule P4, § a, allows the institution of 
constructive contempts by "the court on 
its own motion, by the State's attomey 
or by any person having actual knowl-
edge of the alleged contempt." After the 
proceeding is instituted, the defendant is 
issued a show cause order requiring him 
to show cause why he should not be held 
in contempt. Md. Rule P4, § b. It is clear 
that simply citing the defendant to sholN 
cause why he should not be held in con-
tempt is not the equivalent of adjudicat-
ing him in contempt. Gatuso v. Gatuso, 
16 Md. App. 632,299 A. 2d 113, 115 
(1973). The court may, also, appoint the 
State's Attorney or any other member of 
the Bar to prosecute the case. State v. 
Roll, supra, 298 A. 2d, at 878. So many 
of these procedures partake of the na-
ture of a criminal proceeding that it 
[E] THE FORUM 
seems illusory to call the action a "civil" 
contempt. Courts should be more con-
cemed with the constitutional rights of 
defendants than they are with mere 
forms or labels attached to proceedings. 
The Argersinger ruling should be ex-
tended to the case of a civil contemnor 
since such action has many of the attri-
butes of a criminal action, except for the 
name civil. The only problem would 
seem to be statutory authority for the 
appointment of counsel in Maryland. 
The next issue of THE FORUM will pose 
such a solution. 
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At common law, the parent - child re-
lationship alone is an insufficient basis 
for holding the parent liable for the torts 
of his minor child. Kerrigan v. Carroll, 
168 Md. 682, 179 A. 53 (1935). Under 
the common law, however, there are 
many examples where the parent be-
comes liable for the intentional torts of 
his minor children. Liability is often 
based on the parent's knowledge or im-
puted knowledge concerning the vicious 
propensities of the child to do acts which 
would injure persons or property. The 
mere knowledge however, of this dispo-
sition is not of itself sufficient to impose 
liability upon the parent. Conde! v. Savo, 
350 Pa. 350, 39 A.2d 51 (1944). The 
liability results from the parent's failure 
to restrain the child where he knows that 
the child is likely to injure others. Ryley v. 
Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641 (D. Ida. 1933). 
Liability is also often based on an 
agency "respondeat superior" theory. 
In this situation, the parent may be held 
liable for his minor child's tort, where the 
child was acting within the scope of his 
employment and the parent is the 
employer. Hawes v. Haynes, 219 N.C. 
535, 14 S.E. 503 (1941). The parent 
may also be held liable under this theory 
where he consents to or ratifies the 
child's tort. Statz v. Poke, 266 Wis. 231, 
62 N.W.2d 556 (1954). 
The dangerous instrumentalities doc-
trine is another basis for the liability of 
the parent for the torts of his child. In 
these cases, liability has been found 
where the parent permits his child to use 
a chattel which is likely to be so used that 
it will cause harm to others, because of 
the child's immaturity. Gerlat v. Christ-
ianson, 108 N.W.2d 194 (Wis., 1961). 
Under this doctrine, the parent is not ac-
tually liable for the child's tort, but for his 
own negligence in making it possible for 
the child to use the dangerous instru-
mentality. The parent's responsibility for 
the tort arises from the act of creating the 
risk by placing the instrumentality in the 
hands of his child whose use of the item 
will cause a significant risk to third par-
ties. Before the liability attaches, the par-
ent's negligence in permitting the child to 
have such an instrumentality must be 
shown and the injury must be shown to 
be reasonably forseeable. Dickens v. 
Barnham, 69 Colo. 349, 194 P. 356 
(1920). 
In the determination of liability under 
the dangerous instrumentalities doc-
trine, four factors must be taken into ac-
count: (1) the nature of the instrumental-
ity, (2) the facts constituting the child's 
incompetency, (3) the parent's knowl-
edge of those facts and (4) the parent's 
failure to act in a reasonable manner so 
as to prevent the minor child's tort. 19 
Ala.L.Rev. 123 (1966). In applying 
these factors, the parent's knowledge of 
the child's incompetency is imputed 
from the parent's familiarity with facts of 
the child's incompetency, because of the 
close relationship. Stoelting v. Hauck, 
32 N.J. 87, 159 A.2d 385 (1960). The 
greater the incompetency and the more 
dangerous the instrumentality, the 
greater the probability that knowledge of 
the parent's incompetency will be found. 
Johnson v. Glidden, 80 So.2d 701 (Ra. 
1955). 
While the common law does not pro-
vide for parental liability for the torts of 
their minor children solely on the basis of 
the parental relationship, statutory law in 
effect in forty-six states does provide for 
such liability. In Maryland, Article 26 § 
71A of the Md. Annot. Code proVides 
for the recovery from parents for dam-
ages "willfully or maliciously caused or 
committed by the minor child of such 
parent." Recovery is allowed not only 
for property losses, but also for medical 
expenses. There is a $1,000 limitation 
on parental liability. 
In most of the states which have such 
parental liability statutes in effect, the 
statutes were passed in the last twenty 
years. Michigan was one of the first states 
to enact such a statute; publication of the 
favorable results of the Michigan Act in 
the non-academic media, especially in 
an article in the Family Circle magazine, 
reprinted in 68 Reader's Digest 161:1 
(1956) was influential in the passage of 
similar acts in other states. This article 
reported significant reductions in 
juvenile crime in major Michigan cities 
after its enactment. More recently how-
ever, writers have questioned the signifi-
cance of these statutes in the rates of 
juvenile crime. (See Freer, "Parental Li-
bality [sic] for Torts of Children" 53 
Ky.L.J. 254 at p. 265.) 
The constitutionality of these statutes 
has been attacked in five reported cases. 
In four out of the five cases, the statutes 
have been upheld as a proper exercise of 
the police power of the state. Only in the 
Georgia case of Corley v. Lewless, 227 
Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 776 (1971) did the 
court decide that the statute was uncon-
stitutional. The reason it gave was that 
liability without fault is a violation of due 
process; it did not indicate why it is in fact 
such a violation. It is clear that the court 
does not mean this literally because 
there are several important examples of 
liability without fault in the law. Work-
man's Compensation and products lia-
bility are just two examples. (See 23 
Mercer L.Rev. 681 at page 682.) 
The strongest argument in favor of 
constitutionality was made by the Mary-
land Court of Special Appeals in the case 
of Matter of Sorrell, 20 Md. App. 180, 
315 A.2d 110 (1974). In this case, a 
juvenile master found the two Sorrell 
children guilty of punching and injuring 
another child. The parents of the Sorrell 
children appealed a judgment against 
them for the damages caused by their 
children. The Court of Special Appeals 
cited Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 
U.S. 483, 99 L.Ed. 563, 75 S.Ct. 461 
(1955) in finding the statute a valid exer-
cise of the police power of the state. In 
that case it was held that state legislation 
imposing regulations under the police 
power is valid if it might have been 
thought by the legislature that the par-
ticular measure was a rational way to 
correct it. The court also cited Atlantic 
Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 
58 L.Ed. 721, 34 S.Ct. 364 (1914) 
which stated that "the exercise of the 
power is fair when the purpose is a prop-
er public one and the means employed 
bear a real and substantial relation to the 
end sought and are not arbitrary or op-
pressive." 323 U.S. at 558. The court 
also stated its agreement with an argu-
ment made by the court in Kelly v. 
Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civil 
Appeals 1961), another case upholding 
the constitutionality of a parental liability 
statute. The argument was that there is a 
legislative determination that it is better 
that the parents be required to pay for 
the damages of their children even 
though they be faultless, than to let the 
damage pass on to the innocent victim. 
As this determination bears a real and 
substantial relation to the end sought 
and is not arbitrary or oppressive, it is 
therefore a proper exercise of the police 
power of the state. 
It does not appear likely that the pres-
ent United States Supreme Court will 
overrule these state statutes as an un-
constitutional infringement of due pro-
cess. A more liberal court, however, 
could easily find that the rational basis 
for this legislation is overwhelmed by the 
public policy against punishing one per-
son for the injuries of another, in the ab-
sence of the commercial relationship 
found in the Workmen's Compensation 
or products liability areas. 
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